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‘The bank is something else than men. It happens that 
every man in a bank hates what the bank does and yet the 
bank does it. The bank is something more than men, I tell 
you. It’s the monster. Men made it, but they can’t control 
it’ 
−John Steinbeck, The Grapes of Wrath 
 
‘I’m doing God’s work’ 
−Lloyd Blankfein, CEO of Goldman Sachs 
 
 
Introduction1 
In 1941 Paul Sweezy (1910-2004), a founding member of the 
‘monopoly capital’ school of Marxism, published an article on the 
power of US investment banks in light of the 1929 stock market crash 
and ensuing depression. His assessment of their relative position and 
future prospects within the corporate hierarchy was bleak. Although 
the major investment banks had survived the turbulent 1930s, Sweezy 
                                                 
1 This is an author-edited pre-print of a chapter published in 2012 in Henk Overbeek 
and Bastiaan van Apeldoorn (eds), Neoliberalism in Crisis, Basingstoke, UK: 
Palgrave Macmillan. Earlier versions of the paper were presented at the 2009 
Rethinking Marxism conference at UMASS Amherst, the 2010 International Studies 
Association conference in New Orleans and the 2010 Eastern Economic Association 
conference in Philadelphia. The paper has benefitted from the insightful comments 
and criticisms of many people, especially Bastiaan van Apeldoorn, Joseph Baines, 
Joe Francis, Elif Genc, Jeremy Green, Brenda McComb, Jonathan Nitzan and Henk 
Overbeek. The usual disclaimers apply.  
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argued that they failed to reassert the dominance they secured during 
the initial transition from competitive to monopoly capitalism around 
the turn of the twentieth century (see Veblen 1923). Firms that once 
embraced the guidance of investment bankers had matured into giants 
capable of expanding their operations through internal financing. As a 
result, most of the securities market activity that took place involved 
routine refunding operations that required little investment bank 
expertise, while those few securities that were newly issued were 
privately placed with increasingly powerful institutional investors.  
 Taken together, Sweezy (1941: 66; 1942: 265−269) suggested that 
these changes signified a ‘simple atrophy of functions’ for investment 
banks, whose remaining business was ‘being carried on to an 
increasing extent by new methods and by new agencies better suited to 
the task’. Investment banks played a crucial role in the consolidation of 
monopoly capitalism. Yet once this process was completed, Sweezy 
(1941: 67-8; emphasis in original) argued that they ceased to ‘play a 
special role in the economic life of the country’. The power vacuum 
left in the wake of their decline would likely be filled by the state and 
family-controlled industrial empires. 
 Forty years later, Sweezy followed up the themes of this original 
article by reassessing the power of investment banks during the heyday 
of monopoly capitalism: the postwar ‘Golden Age’. Investment 
banking had proven to be highly profitable in this period, but the 
community of large investment banks, Sweezy (1981: 249) claimed, 
had still not ‘regained any of its old aura as the aristocracy of the 
business world’. Competition for underwriting and merger services had 
become increasingly fierce. And the diffusion of power created by 
competition was further aided by the growing tendency towards 
conglomeration. Much like corporate legal or auditing services, 
Sweezy (ibid: 250) suggested that investment banks played an essential 
role in the ‘smooth functioning of the corporate system’. But this did 
not provide them with a position of power relative to their corporate 
clients; nor did it stem their relative long-term decline within the 
financial sector. In short, Sweezy reaffirmed his earlier claim that 
investment bank power was a transitory phenomenon strictly confined 
to an earlier phase of capitalist development. And upon reaching this 
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unambiguous conclusion, Sweezy never again revisited the issue of 
investment bank power and its implications for US capitalism.  
 What is most remarkable about this final assessment is that it came 
on the cusp of what Sweezy and other members of the monopoly 
capital school would later identify as a new phase of capitalist 
development in the US. This phase, which emerged in the early 1980s 
and which now appears to be drawing to a close with the global 
financial crisis, has recently been referred to as ‘the age of monopoly-
finance capital’ (Bellamy Foster 2010). According to monopoly capital 
theorists, the main feature of the monopoly-finance phase is the 
‘financialization’ of capital accumulation: a process that involves the 
stagnation of investment in the ‘real’ productive economy and the 
explosion of ‘fictitious’ claims to wealth. And while Keynesianism 
was the ‘ideological counterpart’ of monopoly capitalism, 
neoliberalism, with its free market mantra of ‘sound money’, 
liberalization and deregulation, has emerged as ‘the economic policy 
most conducive to today’s monopoly-finance capital’ (Bellamy Foster 
and McChesney 2010: 52).  
 The monopoly capital school argues that this shift to 
financialization and neoliberalism has led to the resurgence of 
‘financial capital’.2 Power, according to this argument, is increasingly 
wielded by large finance, insurance and real estate sector (FIRE) 
corporations at the expense of the industrial giants that dominated the 
postwar period (Sweezy 1994; Bellamy Foster and Holleman 2010). 
This argument seems to conflict with Sweezy’s earlier claims about 
investment bank decline. Investment banks are, after all, a part of FIRE, 
so doesn’t the apparent resurgence of that sector suggest that 
investment bank power is not in fact a ‘transitory’ phenomenon 
confined to an earlier phase of capitalism, but a very real part of the 
contemporary period? Sweezy provides us with little insight into this 
question because, as was noted above, the issue of investment bank 
power was completely neglected in his work after 1981. Unfortunately, 
                                                 
2 Of course the monopoly capital school is not the only school of Marxism to analyze 
the dynamics of financialization and the rise of finance capital over the past three 
decades. An exhaustive review of this literature is outside of the scope of this chapter. 
But many of the critiques that I make here, especially concerning the problematic 
bifurcation between the ‘real’ and ‘nominal’ spheres, could apply equally to these 
other accounts.   
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the works of other monopoly capital theorists are also of little help. 
The few brief references that are made to the power of investment 
banks merely reassert Sweezy’s original arguments (Bellamy Foster 
and Magdoff 2009: 149).     
 How do we explain this indifference, especially given the monopoly 
capital school’s recent emphasis on financial power? The answer may 
lie in the enduring influence of Sweezy’s conclusions. With this 
justifiably influential figure reaching such unambiguous conclusions 
about the transitory nature of investment bank power, it is little wonder 
that others working within the monopoly capital school tradition since 
then have never seriously re-examined the issue. Another reason may 
have to do with the growing trend towards conglomeration, which 
Sweezy (1981) not only regarded as a further sign of investment bank 
decline, but which he also saw as eliminating any meaningful 
distinctions between financial firms. If investment banks are indeed 
indistinguishable from other financial services conglomerates then 
there is little need to re-examine the power of investment banks as a 
separate category of firms. 
 My purpose in this chapter is to challenge this indifference and re-
examine Sweezy’s arguments about the transitory nature of investment 
bank power. Through extensive qualitative-quantitative analysis, I 
argue that there has in fact been a rapid increase in the power of large 
investment banks from the early 1980s up until the current financial 
crisis. This power is wielded in almost every facet of financial market 
activity and therefore extends far beyond their traditional power in 
underwriting and mergers advisory. But this diversification of power, I 
suggest, does not render the distinctions between investment banks and 
other financial services conglomerates meaningless. The trend towards 
conglomeration is undoubtedly significant. And now with the 
disappearance of independent investment banks in the wake of the 
current crisis, the distinctions between FIRE firms may have been 
irreversibly erased. But I argue that the rapid rise of investment bank 
power over the past three decades, as well as its apparent decline with 
the crisis, cannot be adequately explained if investment banks are 
lumped together with the FIRE sector as a whole. Though functional 
boundaries between firms may have faded, the course of investment 
bank power over the past three decades has been bound up with the 
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unique ways in which they have manoeuvred within US financial 
regulation.  
 This alternative empirical account does not arise within a theoretical 
vacuum. The arguments here are developed out of an engagement with 
the theory of monopoly capital, and particularly with its 
conceptualization of the relationship between power and the central 
process of capitalist societies: capital accumulation. Specifically, the 
theory of monopoly capital relies on a bifurcated view of accumulation; 
one that separates capital into ‘real’ and ‘financial’ spheres. The 
interaction between these spheres is supposed to explain the power of 
investment banks. But as will be discussed in detail below, this 
bifurcated view is logically circular and empirically inoperable. And 
because of this, the monopoly capital approach is unable to explain or 
measure the oscillations in investment bank power over time. 
 My own approach, anchored within the capital as power framework 
pioneered by Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler (2009), takes its 
point of departure in explicitly rejecting the real/nominal duality 
underlying monopoly capital’s theory of accumulation. Instead it 
argues that the central logic governing accumulation is capitalization: 
the discounting of risk-adjusted future earnings into present value. As a 
symbolic quantification of capitalist power to restructure society, 
capitalization provides an alternative starting point for investigating 
investment bank power. I argue that linking the quantitative 
architecture of capitalization to the qualitative manifestations of power 
provides a more compelling account of the changing power of 
investment banks since the 1980s.    
 Finally, this alternative theory of accumulation also leads to a rather 
different assessment of neoliberalism’s role within contemporary 
capitalism. For the monopoly capital school, neoliberalism is said to 
serve the interests of ‘financial capital’. Yet my empirical study 
suggests that this assertion is far too general (see also Kotz 2010: 6). 
Even if financial capital is narrowly equated with so-called financial 
intermediaries, the claim that neoliberalism has served their collective 
interests glosses over the ways in which neoliberal policies and 
regulations have at certain points served to enhance the competitive 
struggles within the FIRE sector (compare the chapter by Paul Lewis 
and James Perry in this volume).  
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 The rest of the chapter is roughly organized into two halves. The 
first half offers a systematic critique of the monopoly capital school’s 
approach to capital accumulation, and outlines an alternative approach 
based on the notion of capital as power. The second half then offers an 
empirical analysis of investment bank power since the 1980s, with 
particular emphasis on the linkages between investment bank power 
and the rise of neoliberal regulation. It then offers some tentative 
thoughts about US financial sector power and the limits and 
possibilities of new regulatory initiatives in light of the current crisis.   
 
Finance, Power and Monopoly Capital  
The monopoly capital (hereafter MC) school’s explanation for the 
power of financial intermediaries is anchored within a theory of capital. 
Most of the time, this theory is not explicit in Sweezy’s writings on 
investment banks. But it is still possible to re-trace how this theory 
informs Sweezy’s arguments about the changing role of investment 
banks. 
 Before the rise of giant corporations in the early twentieth century, 
Sweezy argued that accumulation in the US was governed by Marx’s 
competitive laws of motion, including the tendency for the profit rate 
to fall (Baran and Sweezy 1966: 72). It was in the nineteenth century 
within an environment of fierce competition that the investment banker, 
enriched from the financing of the Civil War and the construction of 
the railroads, began to exert incredible influence over the nascent US 
industrial apparatus. Desperate to stem the tide of excess output, 
deflation and falling profits, the industrial firms of this period 
welcomed the oversight that investment banks, led by J. P. Morgan, 
provided by sitting on corporate advisory boards, facilitating the 
combination of firms into holding companies, and underwriting new 
securities.  
 In orchestrating the combination of small firms into a tightly-knit 
network of colluding giants, the investment banks helped to restore 
these sectors to profitability. But Sweezy argued that in doing so the 
investment banks also planted the seeds for their own demise. As 
mentioned in the introduction, the once-feeble industrial corporations 
had become powerful by the early twentieth century, capable of self-
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financing their operations. Growing profits meant that the industrial 
corporations were gradually able to shed their reliance on investment 
banks.  
 According to Sweezy, these developments had deeper implications 
for the US because they annulled the competitive tendencies that Marx 
predicted would bring about a collapse of the capitalist system. While 
the competitive phase was dominated by the tendency of the profit rate 
to fall, the monopoly phase was governed by a new tendency for the 
surplus to rise. Within this phase, the investment banker’s position as 
the most powerful figure in the US was usurped by the large industrial 
corporation. 
 Space constraints prevent a thorough discussion of the tendency of 
the surplus to rise.3  But the basis dilemma of that tendency is that 
collusive, ‘price-making’ industrial corporations no longer face a 
problem of falling profits, but instead a shortage of profitable, 
productive outlets for their surplus. In order to counteract the tendency 
towards stagnation that this causes, capitalists come to rely on wasteful 
expenditures to absorb the economic surplus. The sales effort, 
government (especially military) spending and the ‘financial 
superstructure’ are all singled out as primary ‘outlets’ for surplus-
absorption.  
 The growth of the ‘financial superstructure’ can be seen with the 
explosion of private and public debt, consumer finance, financial 
instruments, and the ballooning of the financial sector that 
intermediates the proliferating relations of credit and debt. As such, 
‘finance’ still plays a role within advanced monopoly capitalist 
societies. But under monopoly capitalism, financial power becomes a 
dependent force since, as an outlet for surplus, the precise oscillations 
of the financial superstructure ultimately depend on, and can only be 
explained with reference to, the underlying oscillations in the industrial 
‘base’.  
 In MC’s analysis of the postwar Golden Age, finance took a back 
seat to military spending and advertising as the predominant wasteful 
outlets for excess surplus. But from 1980s the MC school turned its 
attention to the re-emergence of finance as the ‘largest countervailing 
                                                 
3 For more detailed explications of this tendency and its relation to the laws of motion 
of orthodox Marxism, see Baran and Sweezy (1966); Howard and King (1992). 
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force’ to stagnation (Bellamy-Foster and Magdoff 2009). And since the 
early 1980s, MC has argued that stagnation, coupled with financial 
explosion, has caused the financial superstructure to de-couple 
significantly from the underlying ‘real’ economic base. As a 
consequence, financial intermediaries have moved beyond on their 
supporting-role as ‘facilitator[s] of the production and distribution of 
goods and services’ (Magdoff and Sweezy 1987: 20), to become the 
primary drivers of accumulation.  
 The MC school offers plenty of data to demonstrate the connection 
between industrial stagnation and financial explosion over the past 
three decades. But it is unclear to what extent this data actually 
supports MC’s theoretical claims. One of the less serious problems has 
to do with diversification, which according to Magdoff and Sweezy 
(1987: 97), made it impossible ‘…to define or delineate the financial 
sector with any accuracy’. Since corporations classified as ‘industrial’ 
and ‘financial’ are both increasingly engaged in intermediation, it 
becomes difficult to separate their financial and industrial activities, 
and impossible to pin down the financial and industrial components of 
profitability.4  
 This ambiguity has its origins in a more pressing problem: MC’s 
bifurcation of capital into ‘real’ and ‘financial’ spheres. This duality 
can be tied back to Marx’s labour theory of value (LTV), which is 
supposed to explain the interactions between the two spheres. For 
Marx, the ‘real’ sphere of industrial capital is denominated in the 
universal unit of ‘abstract labour’ and the ‘fictitious’ sphere of money 
capital in prices. Because the LTV assumes that productive labour 
expended within the ‘real’ sphere is the source of surplus value, what 
happens within this sphere is meant to explain the epiphenomenal 
world of prices.  
 But there is one crucial difference between Marx and the monopoly 
capital school: the latter completely abandoned the LTV as a guide to 
quantitative empirical research (Sweezy 1942). Given that no one has 
been able to identify or measure abstract labour, it could be argued that 
the MC school, which has been careful not only to theorize but also 
empirically explore accumulation, made this move out of necessity. 
                                                 
4 On the problem diversification poses for profit accounting, see Nitzan and Bichler 
(2009).  
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But the abandonment of the LTV came at a hefty price. Recall that in 
the MC framework, what happens in the ‘financial’ sphere ultimately 
hinges on what happens in the ‘real’ economy. But without a ‘real’ unit 
of its own to replace abstract labour, all of MC’s empirical measures 
rely on national accounting data denominated in ‘fictitious’ prices. To 
make matters worse, ‘real’ measurements created by statisticians 
involve a series of circular assumptions about equilibrium and utility; 
liberal concepts that are antithetical to Marxism (Nitzan and Bichler 
2009). Magdoff and Sweezy (1987: 94) recognized the impossibility of 
separating the ‘real’ from the nominal, but never considered the logical 
circularity of relying on nominal data to explain so-called ‘real’ 
phenomena.  
 Yet even if we take a pragmatic approach and assume that price 
measurements offer a meaningful proxy for ‘real’ capital, the 
explanation still runs into trouble. According to the theory, although 
the financial superstructure can de-couple from its ‘real’ base ‘to a 
considerable degree’ this cannot happen indefinitely (Bellamy Foster 
and Magdoff 2009: 72−82). And so the argument follows that periods 
of speculative excesses eventually unravel, and ‘fictitious’ capital 
comes crashing back to ‘real’ capital. But in order to know whether 
this actually is the case, we need to measure real and fictitious capital 
to determine if: (1) there was a coupling between them at some point; 
(2) periods of decoupling are eventually followed by re-coupling 
through financial crisis. To address these issues we first need 
reasonable and comparable proxies for ‘real’ and ‘fictitious’ capital. 
The MC has offered plenty of data on stagnation and financialization, 
but they have thus far neglected to bring measures for these types of 
capital together in order to analyze their long-term historical 
relationship.  
 By MC’s own definitions, ‘real’ capital is represented by ‘the stock 
of plant, equipment and goods generated in production’, while 
‘fictitious’ capital is represented by ‘the structure of financial claims 
produced by the paper titles to this real capital’ (Bellamy Foster 2010: 
6). Employing these definitions, we would have to compare some 
measure of the capital stock alongside the market value of debt and 
equity that has capitalized this ‘real’ wealth. In research that explores 
the thesis of a ‘mismatch’ between ‘real’ and ‘fictitious’ capital, Nitzan 
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and Bichler (2009) provide such measures. Figure 1 reproduces and 
updates their data, which analyzes the relationship between the rate of 
change in the current cost of corporate fixed assets (‘real’ capital) and 
rate of change in the market value of corporate equities and bonds 
(‘fictitious’ capital).  
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Figure 1 'Real Base' and 'Financial Superstructure'? 
Note: Series smoothed as ten year moving averages.
Source: Nitzan and Bichler (2009); Global Insight (series code: 
FAPNREZ for current cost of corporate fixed assets). 
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 According to the MC approach, in ‘normal’ times (i.e. prior to the 
1980s), ‘fictitious’ capital is coupled with ‘real’ capital. Finance may 
become de-coupled from its real base for a while (i.e. from the 1980s), 
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but this deviation from the rule is short lived and eventually, through 
the onset of crisis, fictitious capital must come crashing down to its 
underlying base in the real economy. 
 The contemporary situation seems to support this account: from the 
early 1980s to around 2001 ‘fictitious’ capital accelerates while ‘real’ 
capital declines then stagnates. Throughout the 2000s, a series of crises 
have seen ‘fictitious’ capital come crashing down, while ‘real’ capital 
has continued to move sideways. Since we are dealing here with long-
term trends that unravel over decades, it is too early to say with any 
certainty that the current crisis has led to a re-coupling of ‘fictitious’ 
and ‘real’ capital. But thus far the results seem to fit with the theory.   
  But how do we know that the situation since the 1980s has been a 
deviation from normality? And since it is too early to draw definitive 
conclusions about the current crisis, how do we know that past periods 
of financial deceleration actually resulted in a re-coupling of 
‘fictitious’ and ‘real’ capital? To address these questions, we have to 
go back further. It is within the broader historical picture that the MC 
explanation starts to break down. Notice that the alleged coupling of 
finance with the ‘real’ before the 1980s never actually happened: 
finance has never been coupled with ‘real’ capital. And so what is 
explained as a ‘deviation’ from the norm since the 1980s is in fact the 
theoretical rule. Since the two are never coupled in the first place, there 
is no sense in talking about a period of de-coupling since the 1980s. 
Furthermore, this inverse relation between the two means that periods 
of financial decline have not resulted in its re-convergence with ‘real’ 
capital, but in upswings in ‘real’ accumulation!  
 The complications created by diversification, the logical circularity 
of using prices to measure ‘real’ phenomena, and above all, the 
absence of a meaningful relationship between proxy measurements for 
‘fictitious’ and ‘real’ capital, should be enough to raise serious doubts 
about monopoly capital’s bifurcated theory of accumulation. Without a 
meaningful way of distinguishing between the ‘real’ and financial 
spheres, MC’s explanation of the precise movements of finance and the 
historical changes in the power of financial intermediaries breaks down. 
Sweezy’s research provides useful insights into the changing role and 
power of investment banks from the turn of the twentieth century 
through the postwar period. But these insights are inevitably limited by 
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the theoretical assumptions that underpin his account. Though the MC 
school draws linkages between power and capital accumulation, their 
explanation of these linkages lacks theoretical coherence and empirical 
grounding. Consequently, it is not sufficient to uncritically adopt the 
tools of MC in order to update Sweezy’s analysis of investment banks. 
Instead we need to first re-think the linkage between power and 
accumulation.  
 
Capital as Power  
 
In this section, I outline some features of a capital as power (CasP) 
alternative. Like the MC school, CasP explicitly rejects the quantitative 
dimensions of Marx’s LTV, precisely because of the logical and 
empirical impossibility of the theory’s underlying unit of abstract 
labour. But it goes further in also abandoning the circular assumption 
that the quantities of price are somehow representative of un-
measurable ‘real’ quanta that are supposed to explain them. The 
problem with the real/nominal duality is that it assumes an impossible 
dual quantity relationship between values and prices.   
 Instead CasP argues that there is only one universal quantitative 
reality for capitalists, and that is the market value of their assets.5 As a 
system of commodification based on private ownership, capitalism is 
particularly amenable to numerical ordering: anything that can be 
privately owned can be priced, and that is why the history of capitalism 
has witnessed an exponential expansion of the price system.   
 While prices are the fundamental unit of the capitalist order, the 
central logic governing this order is capitalization: the discounting of 
risk-adjusted future earnings into present value. Of course earnings 
have a lot to do with production. But they extend far beyond the 
factory floor; anything that is expected to impact the course of future 
earnings can be capitalized. Since the fundamental unit and pattern of 
the capitalist order are financial, capital accumulation itself is to be 
understood with reference to a single rather than a dual entity: capital 
is finance and only finance.  
                                                 
5 My overview of CasP in the next five paragraphs draws on Nitzan and Bichler 
(2009; 2010).  
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 But why capital as power? The answer can be traced back to the 
institution of private property. As was mentioned above, anything that 
can be privately owned can be priced, and the price of that asset is 
determined by discounting its risk-adjusted expected future earnings. 
To understand the nature of private ownership, Nitzan and Bichler 
(2009: 228) argue, we need to look no further than the root of the word 
private, whose etymology can be traced back to the Latin ‘privatus’, 
meaning ‘restricted’. It follows that since private ownership is 
organized around the principle of exclusion, the ability to exclude 
others from using that property is itself a matter of organized power. 
Since accumulation is impossible without this institutionalized 
exclusion, power needs to be integrated into our definition of capital 
from the very start.  
 Though capitalization is usually treated as a benign technical 
exercise in mainstream theories of finance, it is recast within the CasP 
approach as a symbolic quantification of capitalist power to restructure 
and reshape society. Whether capitalists own claims on the earnings of 
governments, consumers, industrial or financial corporations, their goal 
is always to accumulate by having the capitalized value of their assets 
grow over time. This dynamic process is inherently relative: capitalists 
seek to increase the value of their assets relative to some average 
benchmark. As capitalists boost their capitalization relative to other 
capitalists, they accumulate differentially, and as a result, augment 
their power.  
 The universalizing struggle to achieve differential accumulation 
provides the point of departure for CasP. Though this process is 
mapped quantitatively, its effects are always manifested qualitatively. 
Thus in place of Marx’s quantitative (labour) theory of value, CasP 
offers a qualitative (power) theory of value that analytically links 
together the quantitative architecture of capitalization with an account 
of the broader societal manifestations of power. The link is always 
speculative. But its advantage is that, unlike Marx’s LTV, it provides 
both a theoretical explanation and empirical tools for exploring the 
nature of contemporary capitalist power.  
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Investment Banks: Differential Accumulation  
 
So how does this framework help us to explore investment bank power 
since the early 1980s? Figure 2 provides the starting point for such an 
investigation by plotting the differential capitalization and profits of 
the top five US investment banks relative to a proxy for what Nitzan 
and Bichler refer to as ‘dominant capital’: the top 100 US corporations 
(ranked by market capitalization).6 Both series indicate rapid growth in 
favour of the large investment banks. 7  In 1973, the relative 
capitalization and net profit of a large investment bank were a paltry 
0.08 and 0.1 times the dominant capital average. In 1981 when Sweezy 
was sounding the final death knell of investment banks, they were still 
insignificant. But since then, both measures have increased rapidly and 
steadily, so that by 2006, the differential net profit of the top five was 
slightly larger than the dominant capital average. From this high point 
in 2006, we see the impact of the crisis on the differential profits of the 
investment bank, which fell back down 0.8 times the average in 2008.  
 The differential capitalization of the large investment banks mirrors 
the pattern of differential profits, but its overall magnitude is lower. 
This suggests that, due to the perceived differential riskiness of 
investment bank earnings, investors have been reluctant to translate the 
increases in profits into equal increases in capitalization. But still, at 59 
percent of the dominant capital average in 2007, and even taking into 
account the crisis-era decline to 54 percent in 2008, the differential 
capitalization of the large investment banks has seen a marked upsurge 
over the past three to four decades.   
                                                 
6 Differential measures are calculated as a ratio of the average market capitalization 
(or net profit) of a top 5 investment bank relative to the average market capitalization 
(or net profit) of a top 100 corporation.  
7 Whether we focus on the top five investment banks or all investment banks in the 
Compustat database makes little difference because the top five is clearly dominant. 
For example, in 1971-1975 they held 85% of the net profits of the sector and 93% in 
2004-2008.  
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Figure 2 Investment Bank Differential Accumulation
Note: Series smoothed as five year moving averages.
Source: Compustat through WRDS (series codes: CSHO for common shares 
outstanding; NI for net income; PRCC_F for price close - fiscal).  
  
 As a first step, the data in Figure 2 bring into serious doubt 
Sweezy’s ‘transitory power’ thesis. Investment bank power appears 
instead to be rapidly growing feature of contemporary capitalism. 
From their subordinate position in the 1970s and early 1980s, the large 
investment banks have achieved rapid differential accumulation, the 
levels of which are now comparable with the uppermost echelon of 
dominant capital. 
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 The task that remains is to offer some explanation for this 
remarkable transformation. We can start by exploring how the power 
of contemporary investment banks differs from their predecessors. At 
the turn of the twentieth century, investment banks wielded their power 
over corporations who sought financing in securities markets. In this 
‘traditional’ role as agents, the earnings of investment banks are 
dependent on the fees and commissions they charge for bringing 
together the two sides of securities market transactions. If we look at 
the pricing power over these activities, there is evidence to suggest that 
investment banks no longer dominate them. For example, average 
brokerage commissions on the New York Stock Exchange have fallen 
60-80 percent since fixed commissions were abandoned in 1975 
(Hoover 2005). During the heyday of investment banking in the early 
1900s, common stock underwriting spreads were as high as 20 to 25 
percent, and for bonds ranged from 5 to 10 percent (Calomiris 2000: 
280).8 The spreads on underwritten common stock declined around 11 
percent for the years 1945 to 1949, and 7.5 percent in 1963 
(Mendelsohn 1967: 408-9) Recent data published in Morrison and 
Wilhelm Jr. (2007: 25) show that in 2000 bond underwriting spreads 
fell to 0.5 percent. Data from Thomson SDC indicate average common 
equity spreads in the U.S. of just 4.5 percent in 2008.  
 The decline in pricing power has gone hand in hand with the 
movement of foreign banks and domestic commercial banks onto 
investment banks’ traditional territory. In 1990 all of the top ten 
underwriters of common stock in the U.S. were stand alone investment 
banks, and by 2003 this was reduced to five (Merrill Lynch, Goldman 
Sachs, Morgan Stanley, CS FirstBoston and AG Edwards), as three 
U.S. commercial banks and two foreign banks entered the league table 
rankings (Morrison and Wilhelm Jr. 2007: 17).  
 In response to the decline in their traditional power, large 
investment banks have moved far beyond their role as securities 
market agents, to become significant principal actors, lending and 
committing their own capital in transactions. The extent of this shift 
away from this traditional agent role is shown in Table 1.  
                                                 
8 The underwriting spread is the difference between the price paid by the investment 
bank to issuing corporation for its securities, and the price the issue is then sold for in 
securities markets.   
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Table 1 Large Investment Bank Revenues (% of Total Revenues) 
 
Period 
Commissions 
and Fees 
Investment 
Banking 
Income 
Interest 
and 
Related 
Income 
Principal 
Transactions 
1982-1986 17.7 13.2 46.8 13.6 
1993-1997 13.8 9.7 50.5 16 
2004-2008 6.4 8.8 59.7 16.3 
Note: The cut off point for large investment banks in Table 2 is  
determined by annual revenues. From 1982 to 1990 the cut off 
point is revenues of $1 billion or higher. From 1990 to 1999 it is 
$1.5 billion or higher. For 2000 to 2008 it is $3 billion or higher. 
 
Source: Compustat though WRDS (series codes: CFBD for 
commissions and fees; IBKI for investment banking income; IDIT 
for interest and related income; PTRAN for principal transactions; 
REVT for total revenue).  
 
 Large investment banks’ investment banking and commissions 
business has been halved from 1982-1986 to 2004-2008, while their 
income from interest and principal trading (from their own inventory 
of securities) has jumped from 60 to 76 percent over the same period. 
These trading operations now take place on a global scale, and include 
everything from asset-backed securities, currencies and derivatives to 
commodities, insurance and real estate (The Economist 2007).  
 In the past, investment banks relied primarily on the obedience of 
corporations to seek out their services, which allowed them to exact a 
substantial mark-up for these services. Yet the long-term reduction in 
spreads and fees for investment banking services indicates that this 
pricing power has declined significantly; while the decreased reliance 
of investment bank revenues on traditional investment banking 
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suggests that their power is now wielded in other areas. Investment 
bank power has become diversified into many other facets of global 
securities markets. And the growing complexity of these markets 
means growing complexity for investment bank power relations.  
 Consider, for example, the investment banks’ recent role in global 
commodities markets. Since the early 1990s, Goldman Sachs in 
particular has been buying heavily into ‘long’ positions in commodities 
futures, leading some to suggest that it played a key role in 
orchestrating the dramatic spikes in oil and wheat prices in 2008 
(Taibbi 2009; Kaufman 2010). Regardless of whether Goldman Sachs 
single-handedly orchestrated these price spikes or not, it is clear that 
their power now extends far beyond corporate finance into areas that 
impact the very survival of humanity: food and energy.  
 It could be suggested that this diversified power is now qualitatively 
indistinguishable from the power of other financial conglomerates. 
This may be the case as far as functions are concerned, especially with 
the disappearance of independent investment banks in 2008. But if we 
want to explain why investment banks rose from insignificant players 
in the early 1980s to diversified giants in the 2000s, then I argue that it 
still makes sense to analyze them separately. This is not because of any 
distinctiveness in their functions, but due to the rather unique ways 
they have manoeuvred within, and also shaped, the global shift towards 
neoliberal regulation from the 1980s to the current crisis.  
 
Diversified Power and Neoliberal Regulation  
The ‘Volcker Shock’ (1979-1982) is often considered to be a ‘founding 
moment’ in the history of neoliberalism (Panitch and Gindin 2009: 23). 
Little consensus exists as to the exact causes of the 1970s inflation, nor 
as to what allowed the Federal Reserve under Paul Volcker to raise 
interest rates in order to combat it. But one important consequence of 
the Volcker Shock seems clear-cut. The Federal Reserve’s ‘sound 
money’ crusade, which saw prime lending rates increase from 7 
percent in 1976 to 19 percent in 1981,9 irreversibly disrupted the ‘live-
and-let-live compact’ that had up till then existed between investment 
                                                 
9 Data is from the IMF through Global Insight (series code: A111L60P.A).  
19 Sandy Brian Hager 
and commercial banks on opposites of the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 
(Hayes and Hubbard 1990: 110).10  
 Volcker’s interest rate hikes had a negative impact on the 
commercial banking side of the Glass-Steagall wall. Interest rate 
ceilings on bank deposits imposed as part of Glass-Steagall’s 
Regulation Q served as a particular disadvantage to commercial banks, 
whose deposit base was being stripped away by the investment banks’ 
money market mutual funds. These investment vehicles proved popular 
in the context of high interest rates, offering market rates of return and 
all the basic features of a bank account. On the assets side, rising 
interest rates made bank loans more costly relative to securities 
markets, and the issuance of commercial paper became a favoured 
option in corporate financing. This directly benefitted the investment 
banks that underwrote these and other debt issues.  
 The commercial banks started to voice complaints that Glass-
Steagall was being applied unevenly to the benefit of investment banks. 
But they did not respond by advocating the re-establishment of Glass-
Steagall barriers. While they may have been negatively impacted by 
the onset of neoliberalism, the commercial banks felt that neoliberal 
financial deregulation would help restore their once-dominant position. 
As Thomas G. Labrecque, former president of Chase Manhattan, put it, 
‘[t]he solution is not to rid ourselves of the invaders on our turf … 
Rather we’ve got to be allowed to compete more fully in the 
marketplace’ (cited in Bennett 1982: 12). In other words, commercial 
banks wanted access to securities market business that the neoliberal 
monetary policy had made so appealing.  
 Some commercial banks tried to invade investment banking turf by 
exploiting loopholes within the legislation (Bleakley 1984). But this 
was staunchly resisted by the investment bankers’ main professional 
association, the Securities Industry Association (SIA), and led to 
protracted legal battles (Hall 1986). During this time, the weight of the 
government was firmly tilted in favour of the investment banks. 
Federal Reserve chairman Paul Volcker (1979-1987) and Treasury 
Secretary Donald Regan (1981-1985), a former Merrill Lynch CEO, 
                                                 
10 The most important feature of the Glass-Steagall Act was that it barred deposit-
taking commercial banks from engaging in the securities underwriting and trading 
undertaken by their investment bank counterparts.   
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were lukewarm towards dismantling of Glass-Steagall barriers 
(Schlesinger 2002). In 1981 the government did, however, agree to 
phase out Regulation Q. But this was done only gradually over a five 
year period, and by the time the final ceilings were abandoned in 1986, 
the damage to commercial banks’ deposit base had already been done. 
Even though inflation was ‘tamed’ and interest rates declined through 
the early to mid-1980s, there was little sign of commercial banks 
recapturing their traditional business back from securities markets 
(Hager 2010).  
 Government reticence towards dismantling Glass-Steagall 
underpinned the investment banks’ power to exclude commercial 
banks from their business. But to what extent did this actually impact 
accumulation? The accumulation trajectories of investment and 
commercial bank during the early phase of neoliberalism were 
impacted by a myriad of factors. As a result, any attempt to empirically 
assess the impact of the Volcker Shock on their accumulation is 
necessarily speculative. Issues concerning regulation were, however, 
constantly debated in the financial press during this period; and for 
some, the regulatory barriers of Glass-Steagall were regarded as the 
‘most urgent issue for the US financial community’ (The Economist 
1987: 5).  
 With this in mind, there is evidence to suggest that the ushering in 
of the neoliberal era, specifically the switch to monetarism and 
deregulation, lead to the dramatic restructuring of power from 
commercial banks to investment banks. Figure 3 plots the differential 
capitalization and profits of the top five investment banks relative to 
the top five commercial banks (again ranked by market capitalization).  
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 Here we see that from 1975 to 1985 the differential profits of the 
investment banks doubled from 0.17 to 0.34 times commercial banks, 
before doubling again to 0.68 in 1987. Meanwhile their differential 
capitalization rose from 0.1 in 1975 to a high of 0.67 in 1985.  
 In the early stages of the 1980s ‘bank wars’ (Prins 2004), 
investment banks were the clear victors. Yet as Figure 3 also shows, by 
the mid-1980s the course of accumulation would turn against them. 
Reeling from the 1987 stock market crash and insider-trading scandals, 
the differential capitalization and profits of large investment banks 
started to plummet. The onset of this fallout was doubly-fortuitous for 
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the commercial banks as it coincided with the 1987 appointment of 
Alan Greenspan, the high priest of neoliberal deregulation, to replace 
Volcker as Federal Reserve chairman. Greenspan, who previously held 
posts on the board of directors for commercial banks J.P. Morgan and 
Morgan Guaranty Trust, immediately set his sights on dismantling 
Glass-Steagall. The Fed never made reference to the disadvantaged 
position of commercial banks in trying to justify deregulation. Instead 
it argued that Glass-Steagall stood as an unnecessary barrier to the 
more efficient forces of free market competition (Greenspan 2007). 
And given deregulation in other parts of the world, the Fed feared that 
Glass-Steagall was hampering the global competitiveness of the US 
financial system (Rosenstein 1989). Soon new provisions were passed 
allowing commercial bank subsidiaries to underwrite some securities. 
From a position of weakness, the investment banks, led by the SIA, 
finally dropped their opposition to Glass-Steagall reform in 1989 
(Bush 1989). 
 With dominant financial intermediaries now united in pushing for 
neoliberal deregulation, the Glass-Steagall Act was gradually chipped 
away throughout 1990s and officially repealed in 1999. The 
deregulation wave of the 1990s was accompanied by a wave of 
merger/conglomeration that effectively removed most of the remaining 
functional and regulatory distinctions between commercial and 
investment banks. The ‘main divide’ was no longer between 
commercial and investment banks, but between giant financial 
conglomerates and their smaller, less diversified banking counterparts 
(Johnson and Kwak: 2010: 86).  
 The data suggest that the repeal of Glass-Steagall did not have a 
negative impact on investment bank accumulation. Relative to 
dominant capital as a whole (see Figure 2), the differential 
capitalization of the investment banks grew rapidly in the 2000s. And 
relative to dominant commercial banks (see Figure 3), the investment 
banks were able to ‘tread water’ from 2003-2007 after a decline which 
likely had more to do with the dot com crisis than with the repeal of 
Glass-Steagall. But as the current crisis has now made plain, the ability 
of investment banks to keep up in the post-Glass-Steagall world was 
built upon an edifice of (leveraged) sand. Like the initial rise of 
investment bank power, the collapse of the independent investment 
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bank model can only be explained with reference to the unique ways in 
which investments banks experienced neoliberal deregulation.  In other 
words, the analysis here suggests that the generally accepted 
explanation of neoliberalism as a class project of ‘finance’ in general, 
or of ‘big finance’ in particular, is misleading insofar as it neglects the 
inter-sectoral power struggles between financial firms over the course 
of regulation.  
 After the demise of Glass-Steagall commercial banks remained 
subject to the regulations of the Federal Reserve, the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation and the Comptroller of the Currency, whereas 
investment banks continued to be supervised by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC). It was during this time that the large 
investment banks wanted to expand further into booming businesses 
such as asset-backed securities and derivatives (Labaton 2008). The 
only thing that stopped them from doing so was the SEC’s ‘net capital 
rule’ which required investment banks to limit debt to twelve times 
their equity. This rule made it difficult for the investment banks to 
compete with commercial banks in the increasingly complex world of 
finance. Despite the long-term decline of their deposit base, the 
balance sheets of commercial banks were still significantly larger than 
the investment banks, and this allowed them to take significant 
investment positions without resorting to excessive leveraging (Prins 
2009). Led by Goldman CEO Henry Paulson, the investment banks 
began in 2000 to lobby for changes to the net capital rule.11 In a now-
infamous decision in 2004, the SEC gave into pleas by the ‘big five’ 
investment banks to self-monitor their investment positions through 
their own risk models (Ritholz 2009).  
 Investment bank leverage increased 42 percent from 2002-2007, 
and by 2007 assets were 31 times equity (Roxburgh et al 2010). This 
explosion was funded primarily through short-term instruments (70 
percent of total assets 2006) such as repurchase agreements (repos). 
Under stricter regulations and with bigger balance sheets, commercial 
bank gross leverage actually decreased three percent from 2002-2007, 
and at the height of the 2007 boom the ratio of commercial bank assets 
                                                 
11 Paulson would later go on to serve as Treasury Secretary from 2006-2009. For an 
eye-opening account of the revolving door between Goldman Sachs and the US 
federal government, see Johnson and Kwak (2010: 92−94).  
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to equity was 12 to 1, and only 11 percent of their funding in 2006 was 
short term.   
 The precariousness of this situation became painfully obvious with 
the onset of crisis in 2007-8. As doubts about the quality of the of 
mortgage-backed securities held by investment banks grew, repo 
market creditors began to demand more collateral in exchange for 
financing (Gorton and Metrick 2010). Faced with difficulties in rolling 
over their debt, the investment banks were pushed towards insolvency 
in 2008. The smallest of the big five, Bear Stearns, was taken over by 
J.P. Morgan in March. Unable to orchestrate a similar commercial 
bank takeover, Lehman Brothers collapsed in September. Merrill 
Lynch then agreed to be taken over by Bank of America. Meanwhile 
the two survivors, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, voluntarily 
converted into bank holding companies in order to gain access to the 
Fed’s emergency lending facilities.  
 In the course of several months in 2008, any of the remaining 
vestiges of the seventy-five year old regulatory separation of 
commercial and investment banks vanished. One of the most notable 
outcomes of the crisis has been the sudden disappearance of 
independent investment banks from the US corporate landscape. This 
collapse, as well as the dramatic rise in investment bank power that 
that preceded it, are intimately bound up with the neoliberal project’s 
own rise and descent with the current crisis. Faith in neoliberal 
deregulation has been shaken, and as a result, calls for reform of the 
US financial system have been growing. Some of the more far-
reaching proposals have even called for a restatement of the Glass-
Steagall Act. But how serious are these proposals? Is financial 
regulation entering a new phase ‘after neoliberalism’? My task now 
will be to outline some of the possibilities and limitations of this 
regulation drive.  
 
From the Volcker Shock to the Volcker Rule 
If the collapse of independent investment banks was one of the most 
notable outcomes in the early stages of the crisis, one of the more 
notable outcomes since then has been the rapid recovery of the FIRE 
sector more broadly. The extent of this recovery can be seen in Figure 
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4. After seeing their share of total US market capitalization fall from 
23 percent January 2007 to 13 percent March 2009, the US FIRE 
sector had by the summer of 2010 recovered nearly half of their market 
share. This would come as little surprise to some analysts. With the 
disappearance of their main competitors, and with the support of 
government bailouts, there is a widespread belief that survivors have 
become more powerful as a result of the crisis (Stephens 2010). Simon 
Johnson (2009: 49), former chief economist at the IMF, argues that the 
crisis has laid bare the existence of a ‘financial oligarchy’ in the US; 
one that possesses political weight ‘not seen in the U.S. since the era of 
J.P. Morgan (the man)’. 
 Even before this recent FIRE recovery, calls for regulation were 
gaining support. But persistently high unemployment, coupled with the 
record breaking profits and massive executive bonus announcements 
by firms such as Goldman Sachs, have served as the real catalyst 
rallying public support for regulation. In the financial press, the merits 
of reinstituting the Glass-Steagall Act are constantly debated. But even 
most progressives claim that Glass-Steagall is ill-equipped for the 
complexities of modern finance (Kregel 2010). There are, however, 
some other proposals that aim to combat the power of financial 
conglomerates by erecting regulatory barriers between various 
financial activities. One such proposal has been spearheaded by none 
other than former Federal Reserve Chairman and now presidential 
advisor Paul Volcker. In its original formulation, the ‘Volcker Rule’ 
would ban deposit-taking banks from owning or investing in hedge 
funds and private equity firms, as well as prevent them from short-term 
trading with their own capital (‘proprietary trading’). This provides a 
somewhat ironic twist to the history of neoliberal deregulation. It was, 
after all, Volcker’s shock that is thought to have provided the initial 
stimulus for the emergence of the neoliberal project. But he was 
reticent on the issue of deregulation in the 1980s, and now in the 
current environment of scepticism towards unfettered markets, 
Volcker’s ideas on regulation have again gained political currency.  
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 The Volcker Rule was passed into law as part of the Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act in the summer of 
2010. Yet through months of intense political wrangling, the version of 
the rule included in the act was significantly watered down, and critics 
doubt whether the act will have any meaningful impact (Taibbi 2010). 
While most of the main tenets of neoliberalism were already being 
challenged well before the current crisis, the central pillar of neoliberal 
ideology, financial deregulation, has proven far more difficult to 
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reverse. And with FIRE now rebounding from a position of weakness, 
the opportunity for meaningful reform may have already passed.  
 Any assessment of the limits and possibilities for US financial 
reform must also take into account the wider global context. When 
anchored in the global political economy as a whole, a paradox 
surfaces: while FIRE’s domestic resurgence appears to have limited 
the prospects for reform, the persistent weakening of US FIRE globally 
may serve to reinforce these limits. As Figure 4 illustrates, US FIRE’s 
share of total world FIRE capitalization and its share of total US 
capitalization have both rebounded: the former by 12 percent and the 
latter by 38 percent. What matters here is not only that US FIRE’s 
domestic rebound has been much larger, but also the longer-term 
historical pattern in which it has taken place. The decline in US FIRE’s 
share of US capitalization is recent, cyclical and tied to crisis, whereas 
the decline it its share of world FIRE capitalization is long-term, 
secular, and already evident in 2003.  
 As was mentioned above, Greenspan’s initial calls for neoliberal 
deregulation in the 1980s were motivated by concerns about the global 
competitiveness of US FIRE. Deregulation did have the intended effect: 
after losing its global market share in 1980s, US FIRE recovered 
through the wave of consolidation and conglomeration in the 1990s. 
How then can we expect re-regulation in a context similar to that in the 
1980s and without a concerted effort towards global regulatory 
cooperation? Fears about US global competitiveness, whether justified 
or not, stand as a formidable obstacle to efforts aimed at reversing 
neoliberal deregulation.12 The recent backlash towards the ‘financial 
oligarchy’ may point to a widening chasm between dominant FIRE and 
the wider population. But the widespread belief in the sanctity of 
global competitiveness helps to defray these domestic cleavages. When 
this global context is taken into account, Lloyd Blankfein’s assertion 
that ‘what’s good for Goldman Sachs is good for America’ finds few 
serious challengers (Brenner 2009).  
 
                                                 
12 These are certainly the fears that are driving the Republican Party’s resistance to 
the Volcker Rule. In the words of Republic congressman Spencer Bachus, ‘…the 
Volcker rule may spark a mass exodus of clients from US banks to banks based 
abroad’ (cited in Braithwaite 2010: 15).  
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Conclusion 
The analysis here has been framed primarily as an engagement with 
Sweezy’s ‘transitory power’ thesis. Rather than merely updating 
Sweezy’s analysis, it has developed new empirical tools for analyzing 
investment bank power based on a capital as power approach. The 
research results are unambiguous. They show with various differential 
measures that the power of investment banks grew rapidly alongside 
the rise and consolidation of neoliberalism through to the onset of the 
current crisis. What this analysis suggests is that investment bank 
power is not transitory, but transforming. The resilience of investment 
bank power is bound up with their abilities to constantly transform 
their accumulation strategies. Investment banks have diversified their 
activities far beyond their ‘traditional’ role as securities market agents. 
But the distinctive experiences of investment banks in manoeuvring to 
secure advantages within neoliberal regulation highlights the dangers 
of dwelling on the functional similarities they share with other 
diversified financial services conglomerates. 
 Whether or not the surviving investment banks will continue to 
transform and augment their power is an open question. The current 
crisis has brought the most serious challenges to the investment banks 
since the 1929 crash. And the collapse of three of the big five is 
evidence that the so-called ‘Masters of the Universe’ (Wolfe 1987) are 
by no means omnipotent. At the same time, the ability of surviving 
investment banks to not only weather, but in some cases also to profit 
from, the recent turbulence points to the resilience and flexibility of 
their power.  
 In the end, one of the main questions dividing those on the ‘critical’ 
side of political economy is strategic: should the goal be to harness 
power through regulation or eliminate power altogether? The 
alternative focus on differential capitalization suggests that regulation 
has a significant impact on power. At various points in the history of 
neoliberalism, the struggle over regulation has been at the heart of 
accumulation. It has not merely ‘affected’ accumulation from the 
outside. To the extent that regulation is perceived to impact the course 
of future earnings it becomes a key facet of accumulation. At the same 
time, the analysis also highlights how dominant capital groups are able 
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to effectively limit the imposition of meaningful regulatory change 
even through periods of crisis. Here too a focus on differential 
capitalization provides tools to analyze the ways that capitalist power 
shapes and limits regulation. Whatever the precise answer to the 
strategic question, the analysis here argues that in order to confront 
power we must first radically rethink our categories and concepts. And 
that involves rethinking capital accumulation: the process through 
which dominant capitalists actively re-shape and restructure society.  
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